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Abstract
In this paper we endogenize the objective functions of the regions as well as their
decision to provide public investment in a model of competition for foreign owned
mobile capital. We demonstrate that the competing regions can restrict `race-to-the-
bottom' in tax rates by deviating away from social welfare to net tax revenue. It is
optimal for a region to be fully revenue oriented even if that region's ultimate goal
is to maximize social welfare, irrespective of whether the rival region is concerned
about social welfare or net tax revenue. Moreover, we demonstrate that the regions
have unilateral incentive to spend on public investment, except in case of perfect
spillover. In equilibrium, both the regions spend on public investment and end up
with Pareto inferior outcomes.Key words: Mobile Capital, Tax Competition, Public
Investment, Revenue Orientation, Social Welfare. JEL Classications: F21, H25,
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1 Introduction
Existing models of interregional competition for mobile capital either assume that the
governments' strategies are based on the principle of social welfare maximization or the
governments are assumed to be concerned only about tax revenue collected. However, the
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1choice of government's objective function, social welfare or tax revenue, is likely to aect
equilibrium outcomes. It is often argued that the political structure of a country plays sig-
nicant role in determining its government's objective function. Edwards and Keen (1996)
and Wilson (2005), for example, argue that a leviathan government tends to maximize
its net tax revenue to increase in government size so that more revenue is at the disposal
of the government. Following this view, a number of authors have considered that govern-
ments maximize revenue in their models of tax competition (see, for example, Kanbur and
Keen (1993), Janeba (2000), Dembour and Wauthy (2009), Marceau et al. (2010),to name
a few). On the other hand, Hoyt (1991), Hindriks et al. (2008), and Matsumoto (2010),
among others, subscribe to the view that governments are benevolent and maximize social
welfare. In both of these two sets of papers, it is assumed that the government's objective
function, based on which optimal strategies are determined, is exogenously given. Another
strand of literature incorporates political competition into the models of tax competition,
where the utility function of the elected policy maker (representative citizen) serves as
the objective function to determine the optimal strategies to compete for mobile capital
( Persson and Tabellini (1992); Fuest and Huber (2001); Perroni and Scharf (2001); Ihori
and Yang (2009). However, none of these studies recognizes the possible implications of
strategic interaction among governments on the choice of their objective functions. As in
case of strategic managerial delegation ( Vickers (1985); Fershtman and Judd (1987); Skli-
vas (1987), it may be optimal for the governments to deviate from their ultimate goals and
determine the competition strategies based on strategically chosen objective functions. In
other words, strategic interaction among governments may induce them to deviate from
their ultimate goals while deciding the optimal strategies to attract mobile capital. To
the best of our knowledge, the issue of strategic determination of governments' objective
functions has not received much attention in the literature so far. This paper attempts to
ll this gap in the literature.
Moreover, most of the studies consider that regions compete for mobile capital only
in terms of tax rates, although it is well documented that productivity enhancing public
investment in a region enhances its prospect to attract capital. Recently, few studies,
2such as Hindriks et al. (2008), Zissimos and Wooders (2008), Dembour and Wauthy
(2009), Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2010) and Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), have enlarged the
strategy space of the competing regions in order to examine the implications of competition
in terms of both tax rates and public investment. However, in these studies the decision
of whether to spend on public investment or not is treated as exogenous. The question is,
is it always optimal for a region to spend on public investment?
This paper oers a model of intraregional competition for foreign owned mobile capital,
where the objective functions of the governments as well as the decision to spend on
productivity enhancing public investment are endogenously determined. We consider that
there are two regions competing for foreign owned mobile capital. Each region strategically
decides its capital tax rate. In addition, regions may decide to spend on productivity
enhancing public investment, which has spillover eect. It is evident that higher tax rate
in a region makes it less attractive destination for mobile capital compared to its rival
region. However, that region may decide to spend on public investment and makes it more
appealing destination for capital in spite of its higher tax rate, unless there is perfect spill
over of public investment. We show that it is optimal for each region to be fully revenue
oriented, even if its ultimate goal is to maximize social welfare, irrespective of whether the
rival region is concerned about social welfare or net tax revenue. This result holds true
irrespective of whether the regions decide to spend on public investment or not. In other
words, it is always optimal for the competing regions to choose their respective net tax
revenue maximizing strategies. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Increase in
social welfare orientation of a region makes it more aggressive in tax competition, which
in turn induces it to reduce its tax rate more than proportionately than the reduction in
its rival's tax rate. As a result, loss of net tax revenue of the more social welfare oriented
region, due to reduction in its tax rate, is greater than its gains from returns to immobile
factors, due to increased capital ow in that region. When the regions spend on public
investment, higher social welfare orientation of a region induces it (its rival) to spend more
(less) on public investment as well as to set lower tax rate than its rival, in spite of the
positive eect of public investment of a region on its tax rate. Therefore, both net tax
3revenue as well as social welfare of a region are decreasing in its social welfare orientation.
These are new insights. This paper also demonstrates that the competing regions can
restrict race-to-the-bottom in tax rates by deviating away from social welfare to net tax
revenue.
Moreover, we show that the regions have unilateral incentive to spend on public invest-
ment, unless the spill over is perfect. The reason is, if a region provides public investment,
the other region needs to counteract that by reducing tax and spending on public in-
vestment, since only tax reduction is sub-optimum from both social welfare and net tax
revenue point of view. On the other hand, if a region does not spend on public investment,
by providing some level of public investment the other region can increase tax rate to some
extent and still attract more mobile capital, which in turn lead to higher net tax revenue
as well as higher returns to immobile factor of the other region. However, when both the
regions spend on public investment, positive eect of a region's public investment on its
attractiveness cancels out due to the negative eect of its rival's spending on public invest-
ment. Therefore, regions face a Prisoners' dilemma type of situation while taking decision
about public investment. In equilibrium, both the regions spend on public investment and
end up with Pareto inferior outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic
model. Section 3 develops the equilibrium analysis in absence of public investment. Section
4 proceeds with the endogenous determination of public investment and reexamines the
issue of strategic determination of governments' objective functions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two regions, region-1 and region-2, competing for foreign owned
mobile investment capital of total amount one, which is exogenously determined, in order
to maximize their respective objectives. Each region decides the tax rate ti ( 0) on mobile
capital xi (0  xi  1) and the level of public investment gi ( 0), i = 1; 2. Higher tax
rate on capital in any region dampens the ow of capital in that region, but that may lead
4to higher tax revenue. In contrast, public investment in any region facilitates production
in both the regions and, thus, it enhances productivity of capital across regions. However,
the eect of public investment (gi) in region i on productivity of capital in ith region is
higher than that in the jth region, unless there is perfect spillover of public investment.
The cost to provide public investment gi by region i is assumed to be
g2
i
2 , i = 1; 2. So, the
net tax revenue of region i is as follows.




; i = 1; 2: (1)
Following Hindriks et al. (2008), we consider that the production function of a region i
(= 1; 2) is as follows.




; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (2)
where xi is the amount of mobile capital invested in region i,2  (> 0) is the technology
parameter,  (> 0) denotes the rate of decline in the marginal productivity of mobile
capital, and  (0    1) is the spillover eect of public investment in one region to the
other region's productivity. Higher value of  denotes higher spillover eect;  = 1 ( = 0)
corresponds to the extreme case of perfect (no) spillover. Clearly, regions have symmetric
production functions, which are increasing, twice continuously dierentiable and concave
in the level of capital. We assume that  >  > 1. The rst part of the inequality, i.e.,
 > , ensures that marginal productivity of capital is always positive.3 The second part
of the inequality, i.e,  > 1, ensures existence and stability of interior solutions in all the
cases considered.
Assuming that the capital market is perfectly competitive4 and normalizing the price
of output to be one, we can write the returns to immobile factors of region i as, IRi =
[Fi(:)   xi
@Fi(:)
@xi ] = 
2x2
i. Clearly, returns to immobile factors in a region is increasing in
2xi can also be interpreted as the share of mobile capital invested in region i.
3Note that, in absence of any tax and public investment, if full amount of mobile capital is invested in
any one of the two regions, marginal productivity of capital in that region is equal to    .
4It implies that capital is paid according to its marginal productivity
5investment of mobile capital in that region, at an increasing rate . Since mobile investment
capital is foreign owned, social welfare (SW) of a region is given by the sum of returns to
immobile factors (IR) and net tax revenue (NT) of that region:









]; i = 1; 2: (3)
Note that the parameter  can also be interpreted as the rate of increase in `marginal
social welfare' (
@SWi
@xi ) of a region due to increase in mobile capital in that region. The
above formulation of social welfare function is in line with Kempf and Rota-Graziosi
(2010), Hindriks et al. (2008) and Laussel and Le Breton (1998).5
We consider that a region may be either interested only in net tax revenue (NT) or it
may be interested in social welfare (SW). We refer to these two types of regions as `fully
revenue oriented region' and `fully social welfare oriented', respectively. To illustrate it
further note that if a region is debt constraint, its primary concern may be to generate
as much net tax revenue as possible. Otherwise, the region may be concerned about the
returns to immobile factors as well as net tax revenue.6 We allow for the possibility that
regions can have dierent ultimate goals.
It is evident that, in absence of competition for mobile capital, i,e., if there is only
one region, it is optimal for a region to decide the tax rate and level of public investment
that maximizes its NT or SW, depending on whether the region is fully revenue oriented
or fully social welfare oriented. That is, in absence of any competition, a fully revenue
(social welfare) oriented region would try to maximize NT (SW) directly. Any deviation
from that would result in suboptimal solution. The question is, will it remain valid in case
of more than one region? When regions compete for mobile capital, eects of strategic
interaction between regions may render deviation from ultimate goals to be benecial.
Then, how would the regions decide the tax rate (or tax rate and public investment) when
there is competition for mobile capital? We assume that, in order to achieve maximum net
5For further justications of the objective functions of regions see Laussel and Le Breton (1998).
6We note here that, other than scal position, institutional and political factors may also play crucial
roles to determine a region's ultimate goal.
6tax revenue or maximum social welfare, region i (= 1; 2) considers the following objective
function in order to determine its optimum strategies,`ti' or `ti and gi'.
Oi = iSWi + (1   i)NTi ; 0  i  1; i = 1; 2; (4)










where is are decided by the regions simultaneously and independently. Note that, if i = 1
(i = 0), Oi = SWi (Oi = NTi). That is, whether a region would deviate from its ultimate
goal or not, while deciding its optimum strategies, that depends on the equilibrium value
of i.
The above formulation of regions' objective functions can also be viewed as a case of
strategic delegation of authority. We may consider that the central authority of a region
delegates the task to decide the tax rate and level of public investment to a risk-neutral
manager, who may be a bureaucrat or a minister, and oers the incentive structure as in
(4) to the manager. Then, given the incentive structure, the manager will maximize Oi.
By choosing the incentive parameter i appropriately, the region i can induce its manager
to be more or less aggressive competitor. If the equilibrium value of i is such that Oi
coincides with region i's ultimate goal, delegation is not desirable in region i. Otherwise,
region i would benet through delegation.
The stages of the game involved are as follows.
Stage 1: Region 1 and region 2 simultaneously and independently decide their
respective objective functions by choosing the values of 1 and 2, re-
spectively, given their ultimate goals.
Stage 2: Both the regions simultaneously and independently decide whether to
spend on public investment or not.
Stage 3: Regions are engaged in simultaneous move tax competition or in simulta-
neous move competition in terms of both tax rate and public investment.
Stage 4: Owners of mobile capital decide how much to invest in which region.
7We start from the fourth stage by noting that the allocation of capital between the two
regions depends on productivity of capital and tax rate of each region. Since, capital market
is perfectly competitive, marginal return to capital net of tax in region i is F
0
i;xi(xi;gi) ti,
i = 1; 2, if region i gets xi (0  xi  1) amount of mobile capital. It implies that we must
have F
0
i;xi(xi;gi) ti > 0, for region i to get xi amount of mobile capital, considering region
i in isolation. Note that, for any given allocation of capital, if net marginal returns to
capital dier between regions, reallocation of capital from the region with lower net return
to the other region takes place. Therefore, to rule out the possibility of arbitrage, we need
to have the allocation such that net marginal return to capital is same in both the regions.
For feasibility of such arbitrage-proof allocation of capital, x1 + x2  1 must be satised.
We consider that entire amount of mobile capital is allocated between region 1 and region
2: x1 +x2 = 1. In other words, we rule out the possibility of mobile capital to remain idle.
Therefore, the arbitrage-proof equilibrium allocation of mobile capital, for any given levels
of public investments and tax rates, between the two regions is given by
F
0
1;x1(x1;g1)   t1 = F
0
2;x2(x2;g2)   t2 > 0; (5)
and x1 + x2 = 1: (6)
From (5) and (6), we get the equilibrium investment of mobile capital in region 1 and














[(t2   t1) + (1   )(g1   g2)] (7b)
Clearly, the allocation of mobile capital depends on each region's tax rate as well as public
investment. Increase in tax rate of one region negatively (positively) aects the ow of
mobile capital in that (the other) region:
@xi
@ti < 0 and
@xj
@ti > 0; i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. In
contrast, increase in public investment in one region increases (decreases) capital ow in
that (the other) region, unless there is perfect spillover of public investment:
@xi
@gi > 0 and
@xj
@gi < 0, unless  = 1; i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j.
8From (7a), (7b) and (4), we get O1 = O1(t1;t2;g1;g2;1) and O2 = O2(t1;t2;g1;g2;2).








4 > 0, 81; 2 2 [0;1]. It implies
that the marginal eect of one region's tax rate on its own payo increases with the increase
in other region's tax rate. Therefore, tax rates, t1; t2, are strategic complements. On the









81; 2 2 (0;1] and  2 [0;1) . That is, the marginal eect of public investment in one
region on that region's payo is decreasing in other region's public investment, unless there
is perfect spillover of public investment or regions directly maximizes net tax revenue. So,
in contrast to the tax rates, public investments (g1; g2) are strategic substitutes.
Lemma 1: When regions compete for foreign owned mobile capital in terms of tax rate
and productivity enhancing public investment, the two strategies are of opposite nature.
Tax rates, t1 and t2, are strategic complements. Whereas, levels of public investments, g1
and g2, are strategic substitutes, unless there is perfect spillover and regions are net tax
revenue oriented.
It seems to be interesting to examine the implications of possible interplays between the
two strategies of opposite nature on equilibrium outcomes. From Lemma 1, it is evident
that regions' tax-reaction curves, in t1   t2 plane, would be upward slopping. However,
the reaction curves for public investments, in g1   g2 plane, would be downward slopping.
It seems to indicate that in response to under cutting tax rate by region 1 (say), region
2 can either under cut its tax rate and/or increase its level of public investment in order
to maintain the status quo or to attract mobile capital in region 2. Therefore, it is not
necessary that there would be race-to-the-bottom in tax rates. We explore this issue further
in subsequent sections.
93 Regions do not spend on public investment
To begin with, we consider that none of the regions spends in public investment: g1 = g2 =
0. In other words, we assume that the two regions compete only in terms of tax rates.
Therefore, the stage 4 equilibrium outcomes are given by, x1 = 1
2 + 1
2[t2   t1] and x2 =
1
2   1
2[t2   t1]. Plugging these expressions in (4), we obtain Oi =
( ti+tj)[(4 i)ti+i (+tj)]
8 ;
i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. Now, note that, given any (1, 2), the outcome of strategic
interaction between the two regions in stage 3 is given by the following two equations:7
@O1
@t1
= 0 ) t1 =






= 0 ) t2 =
(2   2) ( + t1)
4   2
: (8b)
In the above, equations (8a) and (8b) represent the tax reaction functions (TRFs) of region
1 and region 2, respectively. Clearly, the TRFs of the regions are upward sloping in (t1;t2)
plane. Figure 1 depicts the tax reaction functions of the two regions. We can solve (8a)
and (8b) for the stage 3 equilibrium tax rates as
t1 =
(2   1)(3   2)
6   1   2
(9a)
and t2 =
(2   2)(3   1)
6   1   2
: (9b)
Clearly, an increase in the extent of social welfare orientation of any region, i.e., an








(6 i j)2 < 0, i 6= j. It is easy to check that the impact of a change in social
welfare orientation of region i on region i's tax rate (own-eect) is higher than that on region




@i j. That is, an increase in social welfare orientation
of a region induces that region to reduce its tax rate more than proportionately to the
reduction of its rival's tax rate. Therefore, higher social welfare orientation of any region



























































Figure 1: Tax reaction functions and equilibrium
leads to more intense tax competition, which in turn leads to lower tax rates in equilibrium.
In other words, race-to-the-bottom in case of pure tax competition is intensied in case
the regions are more social welfare oriented. It also implies that, regions can potentially
restrict the race-to-the-bottom by moving away from social welfare maximization towards
revenue maximization. One way to do that is to delegate the task to decide the tax rate to
an authority by oering a revenue oriented incentive scheme. Alternatively, a region can
perceive that a weighted average of net tax revenue and social welfare, with higher weight
given to net tax revenue, as its objective function while competing for mobile capital.
To illustrate this further, note that, due to a decrease in i, the tax reaction function of
region i rotates towards ti-axis and shifts outwards, see Figure 1. That is, for any given tj,
region i chooses higher tax rate (ti), if it is more revenue oriented. In case of delegation,
by putting higher weight to net tax revenue while designing the incentive scheme for the
delegated authority, a region can make its delegated authority to be less aggressive in tax
competition. Then the question is, will it be optimal for a region to deviate away from
11social welfare towards net tax revenue? Does that depend on the ultimate goal (NT or
SW) of the region? How does the equilibrium look like, if the two regions are asymmetric
in terms of their ultimate goals?
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2 (2 + i   j) 
(6   i   j)
3 < 0
It implies that, if region i's ultimate goal is to maximize net tax revenue, it has unilateral
incentive to reduce i to zero and be completely revenue oriented. Therefore, if the regions'
ultimate goals are to maximize respective net tax revenues, it is optimal for both the regions
to set  = 0 in stage 1. That is, in this case, it is optimal for both the regions to choose
their respective net tax revenue maximizing tax rates. We summarize the equilibrium
outcomes, corresponding to the present scenario, in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: When the two regions compete for foreign owned mobile capital only in
terms of tax rates and the regions' ultimate goals are to maximize their respective net
tax revenues, the equilibrium incentive parameters, tax rates, capital allocation, net tax
revenues and social welfare are, respectively, 
i = 
2 = 0, t
1 = t





1 = NT 
2 = 
2 and SW 
1 = SW 
2 = 5
8 .
Note that, if regions perceive their respective social welfare as their objective functions
while deciding the tax rates, i.e., if 1 = 2 = 1, the tax rates, capital allocation, net tax
revenues and social welfare are as follows: t1 = t2 = 
2, x1 = x2 = 1
2, NT1 = NT2 = 
4 and
SW1 = SW2 = 3
8 . Clearly, tax rate, net tax revenue and social welfare of each region is
lower in this case compared to that in Lemma 2.
12Now, lets turn to the scenario where the two regions' ultimate goals are to maximize
their respective SWs. In this case, the problem of region i in stage 1 can be written as
Max
i




























(3   j) 





(6   i   j)
3 > 0:
So, returns to immobile factors in region i (IRi) increases with the increase in region i's
orientation towards social welfare. On the other hand, as noted before, tax revenue of
a region is decreasing in that region's social welfare orientation (
@NTi
@i < 0). Therefore,
the net eect of a region's social welfare orientation on its social welfare depends on the
relative magnitudes of these two opposing eects. It turns out that the eect of increase
in social welfare orientation of a region on its net tax revenue dominates that on returns








(6 i j)3 < 0. Thus,
Max
i
SWi(i;j) ) i = 0. That is, a region has unilateral incentive to be revenue
oriented, in spite of the fact that its ultimate goal is to maximize social welfare. In
equilibrium, both the regions set their net tax revenue maximizing tax rates, which in
turn maximizes their respective social welfare. In other words, in case of competition
for mobile capital in terms of tax rates, net tax revenue maximizing tax rates maximizes
social welfare. The reason is, regions can restrict wasteful race-to-the-bottom in tax rates
by being revenue oriented, i.e, by choosing 1 = 2 = 0. Clearly, the equilibrium outcomes
in this case also would be same as reported in Lemma 2.
Proposition 1: Net tax revenue maximizing tax rate maximizes social welfare, if the
two regions compete for foreign owned mobile capital only in terms of tax rates and both
13the regions ultimate goal is to maximize social welfare.
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 we can say that, in case of symmetric ultimate goals
of the regions, it is optimal for each region to consider its net tax revenue as its objective
function while competing in terms of tax rate. It implies that, no delegation is optimal, if
the ultimate goal of a region is to maximize its net tax revenue. This is same as in case of
no strategic interaction between regions. In contrast, delegation through revenue oriented
incentive scheme is optimal in case of tax competition, if social welfare maximization is
the ultimate goal. In other words, it is optimal for both the regions to perceive respective
NTs as their objective functions, although their ultimate goals are to maximize respective
SWs.
To illustrate it further, note that, if the regions' ultimate goals are the same, in equilib-
rium, they would perceive the same objective function (1 = 2) and set the same tax rate
(t1 = t2). As a result, mobile capital would be equally divided between the two regions
(x1 = x2 = 1
2) in equilibrium. It implies that race-to-the-bottom in terms of tax rates re-
duces tax revenue of each region, keeping the returns to immobile factors (IR) unchanged.
Therefore, irrespective of whether the regions' ultimate goal is to maximize their respective
SWs or NTs, it is optimal for the symmetric regions to be fully revenue oriented.
Finally, lets turn to the case of asymmetric regions, i.e, when the two regions have
dierent ultimate goals. Without any loss of generality, we consider that the ultimate goal
of region i is to maximize its social welfare, whereas region j (6= i) wants to maximize its
net tax revenue. From the above discussion, it is evident that
@SWi
@i < 0 and
@NTj
@j < 0,
8i;j = 1;2, irrespective of whether the regions are symmetric or not. That is, each region
has unilateral incentive to be revenue oriented, irrespective of its ultimate goal and whether
its rival has dierent ultimate goal or not. Therefore, in case of asymmetric regions also,
in equilibrium, each region perceives its net tax revenue as its objective function while
deciding the tax rate. In other words, it is optimal only for region i, not for region j, to
delegate the task to decide tax rate to an authority, and region i oers a fully net tax
revenue oriented incentive scheme to the delegated authority. Clearly, in this case also, the
14equilibrium outcomes are same as that in Lemma 2.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, each region sets its net tax revenue maximizing tax
rate, irrespective of whether its ultimate goal is to maximize net tax revenue or social
welfare and whether the ultimate goal of its rival is dierent from its own or not, when the
two regions are engaged in tax competition.
4 Endogenous determination of public investment
Unlike as in section 3, we now allow the levels of public investments to be endogenously
determined. Note that higher level of public investment in a region attracts mobile capital
in that region. Therefore, suciently higher level of public investment in a region may
nullify negative impact of higher tax rate in that region on allocation of mobile capital.
Also, note that the levels of public investments in the two regions are strategic substitutes,
while tax rates are strategic complements. Moreover, to provide public investment regions
need to incur some cost, and that cost is increasing in level of public investment. Therefore,
the questions are as follows. Is it optimal for a region to spend on public investment? How
does the equilibrium look like when the two regions compete for mobile capital in terms of
both tax rate and public investment? Does it remain optimal for a region, whose ultimate
goal is to maximize its social welfare, to be revenue oriented in case of multidimensional
competition for mobile capital?
Now, in this case the allocation of mobile capital between the two regions, in stage 4,
are given by (7a) and (7b). Therefore, given the extents of social welfare orientation of the




















[(tj   ti) + (1   )(gi   gj)];i 6= j
15Therefore, the outcomes of strategic interactions between the two regions in stage 3 are
given by the following equations.8
@O1
@t1
= 0 )t1 =





= 0 )g1 =
(1   )[1 + (2   1)t1 + 1t2   1 (1   ) g2]




= 0 )t2 =





= 0 )g2 =
(1   )[2 + (2   2)t2 + 2t1   2 (1   ) g1]
4   2(1   )
2 (11b)
For exogenously given g1 and g2, the tax reaction functions of region 1 and region 2 are given
by (10a) and (11a), respectively. Clearly, for any given g2, if g1 increases, the tax reaction
function of region 1 (TRF1), in t1   t2 plane, shifts out and the tax reaction function
of region 2 (TRF2) shifts down, as depicted in Figure 2. As a result, the equilibrium
tax rate of region 1 increases, while the tax rate of region 2 decreases. To be explicit,
note that, for any given g1 and g2, the equilibrium tax rates are as follows: t1(g1;g2) =
(2 1)[(3 2)+(1 )(g1 g2)]







@g1 < 0. The reason is, if there is an increase in g1 and tax rates are same across
regions, region 1 becomes more attractive destination of mobile capital. Such comparative
advantage of region 1 enables it to charge higher tax rate. On the other hand, comparative
disadvantage of region 2, due to increase in g1, induces it to decrease its tax rate.
On the other hand, given any tax rates t1 and t2, the public investment reaction func-
tions of region 1 and region 2 are given by (10b) and (11b), respectively. It is easy to check
that public investment reaction functions of the regions are downward sloping. This is
because public investments are strategic substitutes, as discussed in Section 2. We depict
the public investment reaction function of region 1, denoted by IRF1, and that of region
2, denoted by IRF2, in Figure 3. Corresponding to some particular tax rates, the equi-













Figure 2: Change in public investment and tax reaction functions
librium pair of public investments is denoted by point E in Figure 3. Now, note that, if
tax rate of any one region increases, the public investment reaction function of both the
regions shifts out and the equilibrium changes from point E to E0. Interestingly, if there
is an increase in tax rate of region i, equilibrium public investment of both the regions
increases. Solving the (10b) and (11b), we get the equilibrium public investments, given





2f4 (1+2)(1 )2g . It is easy to check that both
g1 and g2 are increasing in t1:
@g1
@t1 > 0 and
@g2
@t1 > 0, since  > 1. The intuition is as follows.
If there is an increase in region 1's tax rate, region 1 becomes relatively less attractive
destination of mobile capital. As a result, the eect of increase in public investment in
region 2 on its welfare is now higher than that in case there was no increase in region 1's
tax rate. Thus, for any given t2 and g1, if t1 increases, region 2 spends more on public
investment. On the other hand, increase in t1 induces region 1 to spend more in public
investment. Therefore, equilibrium public investment of both the regions increases with
increase in tax rate of any region.
Now, we turn to examine whether regions have unilateral incentive to spend on public












Figure 3: Change in tax rate and public investment reaction functions
j, allocation of capital in region i is increasing in public investment of region i,
@xi
@gi > 0 for
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It implies that, for any level of public investment in region j, returns to immobile factors as
well as tax revenue of region i increases with increase in its own public investment. Clearly,
@Oi
@gi jgi=0> 0, 8i;j 2 [0;1] and  2 [0;1). Therefore, it is optimal for each region to spend
on public investment, irrespective of the extents of welfare orientation of the regions.
Solving (10a), (10b), (11a) and (11b), we get the equilibrium tax rates, public invest-
9Since, xi = 1
2 + 1
2[(tj ti)+(1 )(gi gj)] and ti(gi;gj) =
(2 i)[(3 j)+(1 )(gi gj)]
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6   i   j
> 0 (considering  < 1); i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
18ments and allocation of mobile capital, given i and j (2 [0;1]), as follows:
ti =
(2   i)  [(3   j)    (1   )
2]
(6   i   j)    2(1   )
2 > 0;
gi =
(1   )[(3   j)    (1   )
2]
(6   i   j)    2(1   )
2 > 0;and (12)
xi =1   xj =
[(3   j)    (1   )
2]
(6   i   j)    2(1   )
2 > 0; i;j = 1;2:
It is easy to check that
@gi
@ < 0. That is, higher is the spillover, lower is the public
investment in each region. This is due to the well-known free rider problem. When there is
spillover of public investment, a region reaps the benet of public investment provided by
its rival, at least partially, without incurring any cost. Higher degree of spillover provides
greater incentive to such free riding. Note that, gi = 0, if  = 1. That is, if there is perfect
spillover, none of the regions spend on public investment.







i , where superscript `g;g' denotes that both the
regions spend on public investment. Note that, if only region i spends on public investment,
stage 3 equilibrium public investments and capital allocation can be obtained by solving












j . Similarly, if only region j provides public

















depict the normal form of the stage 2 game in Figure 4.
Region 2
No public investment Public investment
Region 1


















Figure 4: Decision to spend on public investment








2 ; 81;2 2 [0;1]
and 0   < 1. It implies that, if region 2 (region 1) spends on public investment, it









2 ; 81;2 2 [0;1] and 0   < 1. That is, it is optimal for
region 1 (region 2) to spend on public investment even if region 2 (region 1) does not
provide public investment. Therefore, it is always optimal for a region to spend on public
investment, irrespective of (a) whether its rival spends on public investment or not and
(b) whether the extents of welfare orientation of the two regions are same or not. In other
words, in equilibrium, both the regions spend on public investment irrespective of the
regions' ultimate goals. The intuition behind this result is as follows. If a region spends on
public investment, the other region needs to counteract that by undercutting the tax and
spending on public investment, since only tax under cutting is sub-optimum from both net
tax revenue and social welfare point of view. On the other hand, if a region does not spend
on public investment, by providing public investment the other region can increase the tax
rate to some extent and still attracts more mobile capital, which in turn leads to higher
net tax revenue as well as higher returns to immobile factors.
However, net tax revenue as well as social welfare of each region is lower when the regions





i , i = 1;2. That is, regions are worse-o by spending on public
investment. In other words, in equilibrium, both regions spend on public investment and
gets lower net tax revenue and lower social welfare compared with that under competition
only in terms of tax rates. That is, regions face a Prisoners' dilemma type of situation while
deciding whether to spend on public investment or not and end up with Pareto inferior
outcomes.
Proposition 3: Each region has unilateral incentive to spend on public investment.
In equilibrium, both the regions spend on public investment, irrespective of their ultimate
goals - net tax revenue or social welfare, and end up with Pareto inferior outcomes.
20It is interesting to note that more welfare oriented region spends more on public invest-
ment and charges lower tax rate:
@gi
@i > 0 and
@ti
@i < 0. Because, perceived benet from
mobile capital is higher to a welfare oriented region than that to a revenue oriented region,
since fully revenue oriented region does not care about positive eect of mobile capital on
returns to immobile factors. And, allocation of mobile capital in increasing (decreasing) in
public investment (tax rate) in that region. On the other hand, due to increase in region
i's welfare orientation, region j's public investment falls (
@gj
@i < 0) while its tax rate falls




@i < 0). As a result, more mobile capital is
allocated to the region that has higher welfare orientation:
@xi
@i > 0.
Lemma 3: When regions compete for foreign owned mobile capital both in terms of
tax rate and public investment, increase in social welfare orientation of a region induces
it (its rival) to spend more (less) in public investment. However, both the regions charge
lower tax rate, if there is an increase in welfare orientation of either region. Nonetheless,
reduction in tax rate is higher due to increase in its own welfare orientation than that of
its rival. Thus, more social welfare oriented region attracts larger share of mobile capital.
Clearly, the implication of welfare orientation on tax rate in case of multidimensional
competition is same as that in case of competition only in terms of tax rate. In both the
cases, regions can restrict `race-to-the-bottom' in tax rates by moving away from social
welfare maximization towards revenue maximization.
Finally, lets turn to the issue of endogenous determination of perceived objective func-
tions of the two regions. Substituting the expressions of ti, gi and xi from (12) in the
expressions for NTi, IRi and SWi we get,
NTi =
[2 (2   i)    (1   )
2][(3   j)    (1   )
2]
2




 [(3   j)    (1   )
2]
2




[(5   2i)    (1   )
2][(3   j)    (1   )
2]
2
2[(6   i   j)    2(1   )
2]







3 < 0 8i;j; 2 [0;1]. Therefore, it
is optimal for region i to set i = 0, if its ultimate target is to maximize net tax revenue,
irrespective of the extent of its rival's extent of welfare orientation (j). That is, it is
optimal for a fully revenue oriented region to set the net revenue maximizing tax rate and
public investment, no matter what its rival region's perceived objective function is. In
other words, if a region's ultimate target is to maximize net tax revenue, it is optimal
for the region not to delegate the task to decide tax rate and public investment to its
manager, irrespective of the other region's ultimate target and whether the other region
delegates or not. It implies that, if both the regions' ultimate target is to maximize net
tax revenue, in equilibrium, none of the regions delegates. Therefore, in case of symmetric
regions with respective net tax revenues as ultimate goals, in equilibrium m
1 = m
2 = 0,
where superscript m indicates multidimensional competition, i.e. competition in terms of
both tax rate and public investment, between the regions for mobile capital. Lemma 4
summarizes the equilibrium outcomes corresponding to this case.
Lemma 4: In case of multidimensional competition for foreign owned mobile capital, if
the regions' ultimate goals are to maximize their respective net tax revenues, the equilibrium
incentive parameters, tax rates, public investments, capital allocation, net tax revenues and
social welfare are m
1 = m
2 = 0, tm
1 = tm








1 = NT m
2 =
4 (1 )2
8 , and SW m




Comparing Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, we nd that the equilibrium incentive parameters,
tax rates and capital allocation in case of multidimensional competition are same as that in
case of competition only in terms of tax rates, if the two regions are concerned only about
their respective net tax revenues. However, in case of multidimensional competition, net
tax revenue and social welfare of both the regions are less than that in case of pure tax
competition, as in Proposition 3. To illustrate it further, note that each region chooses
the net tax revenue maximizing level of public investment and/or tax rate in equilibrium,
since the regions are symmetric. Thus, the two regions provide the same level of public
22investment and set the same tax rate. From (10a) and (11a), it is easy to observe that, since
m
1 = m
2 = 0, the eect of public investment in a region on its own tax rate is of same
magnitude as that on its rival's tax rate, but these eects are of opposite signs.10 Therefore,
the equilibrium tax rates remain the same as in case of pure tax competition, since regions
do not dier in terms of level of public investment. As a result, the equilibrium allocation
of mobile capital, returns to immobile factors and gross tax revenue are same in both the
scenarios. However, since regions need to incur some cost to provide public investment,
the equilibrium net tax revenue and social welfare are less in case of multidimensional
competition compared to that in case of pure tax competition.






3 > 0 8i;j; 2 [0;1], since  > 1.
That is, returns to immobile factors in region i is increasing in extent of social welfare
orientation of region i, irrespective of the extent of region j's social welfare orientation.
However, net tax revenue of a region is decreasing in its extent of welfare orientation:
@NTi
@i < 0 8i;j; 2 [0;1]. Therefore, whether social welfare of a region is increasing in
its extent of welfare orientation or not that depends on relative magnitudes of the eects
of its extent of welfare orientation on its net tax revenue and returns to immobile factors,







3 . Clearly, if j = 0,
@SWi
@i < 0 ) m
i = 0,
i;j = 1;2. That is, if any one of the two regions set the net tax revenue maximizing
tax rate and public investment, it is optimal for the other region also to do so even if its
ultimate goal is to maximize social welfare. Therefore, (m
1 = m
2 = 0) is an equilibrium,
even if the ultimate goal of the regions are to maximize respective social welfare.
From the expression for
@SWi
@i , it is easy to check that (i)
@SW1




@2 > 0, if (b) (1 + 2   1)  < (1   )
2. However, note that (a) and
(b) together implies that  < (1   )2, which is impossible since  > 1 and 0   < 1.
Therefore, in equilibrium, both 1 and 2 can not be positive. And, we have already shown
that if i = 0, m
j = 0, vice-versa. Clearly, (m
1 = m





23equilibrium, though the regions' ultimate goals are to maximize respective social welfare.
The above analysis also implies that (m
1 = m
2 = 0) is the only equilibrium even if one
region wants to maximize net tax revenue while the other region wants to maximize social
welfare. Because, if region i aims to maximize its net tax revenue, it never sets i > 0.
And, if i = 0, it is optimal for region j to set j = 0 even if region j's target is to max-
imize its social welfare. Therefore, we can say that, irrespective of the regions' ultimate
goals, it is always optimal for each region to perceive its net tax revenue as the objective
function while deciding its strategies to compete for mobile capital. In other words, only if
the ultimate target of a region is to maximize its social welfare, in equilibrium, it delegates
the task to decide the tax rate and level of public investment to its manager by oering a
fully revenue oriented contract.
Proposition 4: (a) In case of multidimensional competition for foreign owned mobile
capital, net tax revenue maximizing tax rate and public investment maximizes social welfare.
(b) In equilibrium, each region perceives its net tax revenue as the objective function while
deciding the tax rate and level of public investment, irrespective of whether the region wants




2 = 0 holds true irrespective of the regions' ultimate goals, the equilib-
rium tax rate, public investment, allocation of mobile capital, net tax revenue and social
welfare remain same as in Lemma 4, even if the regions are concerned about their respec-
tive social welfare or if the ultimate goals of the two regions are dierent from each other.
From the above discussion it appears that, whatever be the ultimate goals of the regions,
it is always optimal for each region to perceive its net tax revenue as the objective function
in both multidimensional competition as well as pure tax competition. Therefore, consid-
eration of fully revenue oriented regions seems to be more appropriate while analyzing the
implications of competition for mobile capital among regions.
245 Conclusion
This paper endogenizes the governments' objective functions and the decision to spend on
productivity enhancing public investment, by developing a model of interregional compe-
tition for foreign owned mobile capital. Considering two competing regions, it shows that
it is always optimal for the competing regions to choose their respective net tax revenue
maximizing strategies, while competing for mobile capital, even if its ultimate goal is to
maximize social welfare, irrespective of whether the competition is only in terms of tax
rates or both public investment as well as tax rate. This result remains valid even if the
two regions are asymmetric in terns of their ultimate goals. It also demonstrates that
the competing regions can restrict race-to-the-bottom in tax rates by deviating away from
social welfare to net tax revenue. Further, it demonstrates that the regions have unilateral
incentive to spend on public investment, unless the spill over is perfect. In equilibrium,
both the regions spend on public investment and end up with Pareto inferior outcomes.
These are new results.
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